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I. Introduction: Nostalgia and Engagement
Why, readers might wonder, would a group of Croatian legal scholars spearhead this volume ? Why would they care, at this specifi c juncture in the history of EU law, to refl ect on a movement -Critical Legal Studies (CLS) -born in the peculiar and utterly American socio-legal context of the 1970s ? Two explanations come to mind. First, nostalgia. Nostalgia explains many types of human behaviour and may have something to do with the genesis of this volume. Contributors Judge Rodin and President Lenaerts, honourable members of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), were both exposed at a younger age to CLS teachings in the United States. 1 They remember their encounter with critical legal theory, which freed them from the dogmatic cage of their coursework at home and allowed, for once, exploration of the law ' s outer boundaries -its implication in power-building, its open-endedness, and its ambivalent relation with the quest for distributive justice. No one ever forgets the travels of one ' s youth and, in the cleverest minds, intellectual tourism leaves the sweetest of memories.
To be sure, CLS ' s critique of adjudication -with its insistence on the inextricable link between judicial function and ideology, on the indeterminate nature of legal arguments, and on politics in the court 2 -could make these judges deeply uncomfortable today. However, their contributions to this volume give that critique a nod and then quickly move on to safer ground. 3 Their superior expertise, classical training and explicit identifi cation of fi rm methodological boundaries in judicial reasoning can reassure the European reader that they have certainly not caught the indeterminacy virus. 4 With due caution, nostalgia can be both pleasurable and harmless. Gratitude to one ' s former teachers for their unforgettable lessons is obviously compatible with parting ways, whether geographically or intellectually.
The other explanation for the birth of this volume is more complex, and has to do with a scholarly project that involves not only notable (male) jurists but also prominent (female) academics professionally anchored in the youngest Member State of the European Union. 5 In one word, we defi ne this ulterior prompt for this volume as ' engagement ' , legal and political. There are times in history when jurists become particularly aware of their responsibility in shaping the structure of government, in informing the discourse of and about law, and in resisting dangerous political trends. 6 The Croatian scholars at the helm of this project clearly perceive themselves to be at such a juncture, and are acting accordingly.
Our own contribution to this volume stems, on the one hand, from a deep empathy with the editors ' project of engagement and, on the other, from familiarity with the CLS movement in the US. We proceed as follows: section II articulates several ways in which the engaged intellectuals who spearheaded this volume may derive both inspiration and tools from American CLS literature. Section III spotlights one particular CLS tool, known as ' external critique ' , and outlines its targets -namely the distributive effects of CJEU cases, their uneven impact on different groups, and their implications for justice across class, gender, race, nationality or socio-economic status. Section IV discusses the role of progressive scholars in bringing distributive stakes to the fore and vigorously engaging in the external critique of judgment in Luxembourg. Section V illustrates two CLS points that complicate the work of the legal scholar -distributive ambivalence and legal indeterminacy -and concludes by reasserting the value of critical scholarship in spite of its unavoidable limitations. 7 See eg Adam Ł azowski, ' Who ' s Got the Power ? Division of Competence in EU Membership Acquis ' , paper presented at the Dubrovnik seminar, www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/ Dubrovnik_2016_-_Programme.pdf . 8 
II. EU Law Scholarship as Engagement
There are at least three ways in which working on EU law in a place like Zagreb is a form of social and political engagement. First, as a scholarly discipline, EU law is naturally poised to challenge established layers of authority in the law faculties of the new(er) Member States. This is because, by defi nition, no bulwark of academic power could until recently be built around this subject. In EU law, expertise is a prerogative of the young -a fact that allows for novel and inverted hierarchies. A testament to the engagement of Croatian scholars in the EU -national law debate is found in the Dubrovnik Jean Monnet Seminars, which have served as a regular forum for East -West dialogue since 2003. These seminars are known for raising anti-formalist issues and for introducing doctoral students to the role of policy and power in the creation and administration of law. 7 The proceedings of the Dubrovnik meetings may be published in the prestigious Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy -a peer reviewed journal of regional scope and broad ambition. 8 A second dimension of engagement appears in the operational dynamics of substantive EU law. Teaching and writing about EU law can be a disruptive, critical project not only in relation to the institutional layers of local academia, but also vis-à -vis the substance of Member States ' law. Because the EU demands the approximation of domestic laws around the time of accession and at each new stage of integration, the process of harmonisation forces scholars, judges and legislators to rethink and question the rationale of national rules. 9 The resulting pressure for legal reform brings existing privileges and unspoken judicial policies to the surface. 10 Legal formalism is no excuse for resisting reform, and legal change must be fought for or resisted on the basis of clear distributive arguments. In other words, in the aftermath of accession, EU law often is critique. It unveils false necessities in Member States ' legal discourse and may identify winners and losers in consolidated domestic legal practices. 11 A loose analogy with CLS is easy to establish here. Two defi ning features of the CLS movement are the denunciation of false necessity in legal deduction and the focus on the distributive and redistributive consequences of legal rules. These very features happen also to be natural by-products of early-stage Europeanisation. CLS was a militant project in the American legal academy of the 1970s and continues to display defi ant and utopian features 12 in the many corners of the world where it has seeped under various guises. 13 It is therefore an inspiration for those scholars who, like the editors of this volume, perceive their engagement with EU law as part of a larger project of justice. 14 Third, and most importantly, this volume refl ects a desire to subject EU law itself to a critical rethinking. It is clear by now that the Europeanisation of law has brought about its own set of questionable dogmas: the centrality of the individual, 15 a structural blindness to intra-EU distribution, 16 a strong market paradigm that often crowds out alternate visions, 17 and a practical indifference to the geopolitical externalities of the project. 18 From the standpoint of Croatian scholars in particular, the EU ' s own role in such post-accession catastrophes as the Euro-zone crisis and the deaths of thousands of migrants in the Mediterranean waters requires closer scrutiny at the very least. 19 When the dust of accession settles and the promises of peace and prosperity fail to materialise, scholarly engagement necessarily takes a sceptical turn and begins to contemplate whether foundational concepts of EU law might themselves be vehicles of distributive and ideological regression. Here, EU law is not the critique. EU law is its object.
The propensity to engage in a sustained critique of EU law marbles several contributions in this volume and certainly animates this chapter. This generally critical stance takes the present stage of legal Europeanisation as a fact and aims to make full use of the possibilities for political and social justice it can currently support, but at the same time it decries its many structural and dynamic drawbacks. In doing so, this critical project borrows liberally from CLS without fear of misreading or misappropriation. Irreverence in this context is a feature, not a bug. 20 The CLS toolkit is clearly useful to European scholars, but there is no pretence here of fi delity to the original CLS conception. 21 Transformations can be productive on EU soil, and there is no reason not to utilise, albeit in a different epistemic environment, the motivational force of lessons drawn from far-away places or times. 22 The CLS toolkit can be embraced selectively; its tenets disassembled and recomposed at leisure. For instance, the methodology of internal critique works best when EU legal deduction is simply fl awed or when interpretive results presented as necessary are no more plausible than the road not taken. 23 External critique is useful when decisions made at any node of the EU system lead to distributively questionable outcomes. The critique of rights -another staple of CLS scholarship 24 -easily takes apart such constructs as EU citizenship 25 and market access, 26 which may lead to a defi cit of substantive justice. 27 What CLS stands for, when translated onto the operational level of EU legal scholarship, is a thorough rethinking of the project of integration through law in any of its formants, 28 not just the judicial one. 29 With no pledge of adherence to the CLS archetype and no obvious political direction, this loosely critical posture may come across to CLS founders as inchoate and even spineless -in other words, as a non-movement. In the current landscape of EU legal scholarship, critique is indeed piecemeal and disaggregated. If it is a project at all, it is one of scattered resistance with no fl ag or army. Yet, as the following sections illustrate, 30 The distinction between internal and external perspectives in law predates the CLS movement. See Brian Z Tamanaha , ' The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a " Practice " in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies ' ( 1996 ) EU law can be better analysed, understood and perhaps transformed when observed through CLS-tinted glasses.
We prioritise here external critique over the many other tools in the CLS kit. By external critique, we mean the scholarly activity of highlighting the distributive stakes -and therefore the political and ideological dimensions -of legal disputes adjudicated by the CJEU. 30 The importance of external critique lies in the fact that adjudication plays a role in eliminating or maintaining privilege, or class and race inequalities. 31 In comparison to the tool of internal critique, which focuses on logical inconsistencies in judicial reasoning and reveals the often ambivalent results of deduction, external critique is a harder sell in Europe, 32 given the still widespread belief in the importance of isolating the judicial function from concern with the political impact of each case ' s outcome. 33 We nonetheless hope to show fi rst, that distributive arguments are as a matter of fact not foreign to judicial reasoning in Luxembourg 34 and, second, that scholarly commentary on the correctness of such arguments, whether expressed or silently woven into the fabric of judgments, is a necessary and important part of the life of engaged jurists. 35
III. Distributive Arguments in Adjudicatory Practice
Whether judges in Luxembourg, or elsewhere, should take into account the larger distributive consequences of their decisions remains an unsettled question. 36 Prominent scholars object to distributive justice as a goal of adjudication because of the conviction that (re)distribution is more effi ciently achieved through taxation 37 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell , ' Why the Legal System is Less Effi cient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income ' ( 1994 ) and other forms of transfers, as opposed to judgment in discrete disputes. 37 But in equally reputable milieus, courts are expected to redress, within the boundaries of judicial discretion, the predicaments of situationally disadvantaged parties. 38 This is because -among other reasons -a distribution-insensitive mode of adjudication would not be neutral , but rather bound to produce regressive results that defy common notions of justice. 39 In European circles, there is a pervasive assumption that distributive arguments do not belong in judicial reasoning. 40 Most courts, aiming to preserve legitimacy and authority, generally cling to the language of internal coherence; to this goal, they stay within the boundaries of doctrinal abstraction and formalism, or at most put forth an even-handed balancing of distributively neutral policies (effi ciency, judicial economy, protection of expectations, etc). 41 CLS notoriously challenges this judicial posture on both normative 42 and descriptive grounds. 43 In an American CLS perspective, a paradigmatic example of judicial responsiveness to distributive considerations is found in Justice Brennan ' s opinion in Penn Central v New York . 44 The facts are well known and are only summarily recalled here. Appellants, owners of Penn Central Station, had sought a permit to build above the existing station ' s structure, but because of a zoning regulation aimed at preserving historic landmarks, their request was denied. The appellants then sought monetary compensation. In their view, the denial of the permit resulted in the taking of their jus aedifi candi and in a signifi cant depreciation of real estate 45 ibid 147. 46 It is often in the AG ' s opinion that one fi nds a more explicit engagement with the distributive consequences of the Court ' s choices. Take for instance the opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, aimed at striking down a reverse discriminatory scheme in Belgium. Case value. Famously, Brennan saw things otherwise. In his view, the appellants should only be thankful for the City ' s time-honoured practice of preserving historic landmarks from disorderly urban development. In fact, strict zoning in the area around the station was precisely the reason for the enormous value of Penn Central ' s property. In the balancing of property rights against public interest, it therefore became clear that the appellants derived great advantage from the very regulatory practice they now deemed harmful and deserved, as a consequence, no compensation. 45 The mode of judicial reasoning adopted in Penn Central may strike some European observers as excessively open-ended, but it is hard to see how the dispute could be seriously resolved without resorting to Brennan ' s distributive logic. The case shows that a lucid consideration of benefi ts and harms is not beyond the realm of judicial functions, but is rather essential to an intelligent adjudication of specifi c cases. Is this type of reasoning off limits in Luxembourg ? Interestingly, it is not. 46 Take, for instance, E Friz , a ground-breaking case decided at the dawn of this decade by the CJEU. 47 In brief, in 1991 Mr von der Heyden received an unsolicited visit by a tax consultant who convinced him to invest, together with other partners, in the modernisation of decrepit real estate in Berlin. For contracts concluded in this haphazard fashion, the EU door-step selling directive grants consumers a right to repent, ie to cancel the deal in a period of no less than seven days from due notice of this right. 48 If the consumer receives no such notice -as was the case in E Friz -the possibility to cancel lasts much longer. 49 instead that he pay his share of the steep losses suffered over the years. This result would comply with German law and in particular with the judicial principle of ' defective partnership ' , duly highlighted for the CJEU by AG Trstenjak in her opinion. 50 The language used by the Court to endorse the latter result was unmistakably sensitive to distributive concerns. 51 In 2010, two full years into the fi nancial crisis, consumers all over Europe and beyond shared Mr von der Heyden ' s desire to walk back from improvident investments. 52 The E Friz judges were surrounded by news of pervasive fi nancial disasters, and were constantly reminded that the consequences of poor fi nancial market regulation would hit some pockets of the EU population much more heavily than others. Apportioning losses fairly, ie protecting those who were hopelessly stuck with the partnership from the sudden fl ight of those who could withdraw their membership, seemed to be what justice required. Interestingly, the Court went beyond mere judicial necessity, and openly appealed to solidarity between those who could fl ee and those left behind in the quagmire of fi nancial disaster. It is at least plausible that the judges could see the analogy between the uneven distribution of losses inside the E Friz partnership on one hand, and Europe ' s larger inequities on the other: the widening of the spreads, the plight of the unemployed and the predicament of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), at that time haunted by serious debt restructuring problems. In the midst of sobering refl ections on law ' s complicity in perpetuating Europe ' s inequalities, it may be important to take stock of narrow, but clear, progress through law. 53 E Friz confi rms that in Luxembourg, whenever an interpretive gap leaves the judge room to manoeuvre, a lucid assessment of circumstances and distributive considerations may precede and guide the decision-making process. The case says nothing, however, on the normative desirability of such arguments inside the court -a point dear to CLS founders. 54 Some contributions in this volume directly tackle the argument that judges should engage systematically and openly in distribution-sensitive argumentation. 55 We take no stance on such a point in these pages. History is replete with situations in which mere judicial adherence to formalism or to distribution-opaque legal arguments produces results which are 56 See Pierre Schlag, ' On Textualist and Purposivist Interpretation (Challenges and Problems) ' (in this volume) (portraying judges and lawyers as engaged in ' a fairly localised and discrete juridical mission ' ). 57 highly desirable from the perspective of substantive justice. It is not our purpose to challenge this type of judicial work on ethical grounds -at least not here.
Our argument here is rather aimed at informing European legal scholarship only ( la doctrine ), in the hope that a feedback loop between judicial and academic milieus may ultimately lead to substantively progressive outcomes in Luxembourg as well as in the EU ' s legislative and administrative fora.
IV. External Critique: The Role of European Scholars
As noted by Pierre Schlag, judges are often excessively narrow in their defi nition of a dispute ' s context. 56 Academic scholarship, on the other hand, is not bound by the built-in constraints of judicial activity nor by the time pressure under which European judges are compelled to decide. Scholars have the necessary institutional freedom and research capabilities to weave together the different narratives surrounding each case, to identify the perspectives of possible winners and losers, and to focus on the broader distributive consequences of a judgment in Luxembourg. 57 An external critique of EU adjudication is essential to ensure that judicial decision-making and its often obscure distributive consequences are known and understood, not only in lawyers ' circles but also in civil society, where choices of broader political salience should be made. 58 This type of scholarly activity is continually needed not only to decipher the reasoning behind technical judicial language, 59 but also to make explicit the law-making by-products of judicial dispute resolution. 60 In addition, European scholarship is an important site of transnational legal theory -a fi eld now undergoing intense critical scrutiny and major transformations, including greater historical self-awareness and global reach. 61 The external critique of adjudication does not fi gure predominantly in the corpus of EU law scholarship. 62 Its relative scarcity may be due to a habit of respect for judicial function, or to the widespread belief that legislation, rather than adjudication, is the proper forum for redressing material inequities. 63 It is also the case that external critique of judicial reasoning is less in tune with the civil law tradition, in which judges are not perceived as ' culture heroes [or] parental fi gures ' , but rather as civil servants, ie riders ' of a machine built and operated by legislators ' . 64 The paucity of scholarly critique grounded in distributive concerns prevents the emergence of a robust, sustained exchange between scholars and the bench that is common in other judicial cultures. 65 The landscape is changing, however, and the Court has experienced deep transformations over its 60 years of existence. 66 The fact that the Court is now staffed by a transnational legal elite and its bureaucracy 67 -immersed in comparative methodologies and moulded by a plurality of legal infl uences 68 -should facilitate a more fruitful conversation between scholars and the judicial branch. 69 To be sure, powerful critiques have been deployed against the Court of Justice on grounds other than distribution. 70 Scholars have often demanded increased argumentation and express weighing of competing policies. 71 They have also engaged in internal critiques aimed at denouncing the Court ' s formalism, identifying its incoherent use of legal ontologies, and deconstructing its reasoning from within. 72 Yet, no matter how thoroughly argued and internally coherent, a judicial opinion may produce regressive distributive effects that need to be clarifi ed in order to be redressed in a timely manner. By the same token, a judicial opinion may have inconspicuous progressive outcomes, which may remain sporadic in application if not suffi ciently highlighted in commentary and then generalised through law and policy. It is the task of scholars across a range of social sciences to engage in this type of analysis.
In our view, legal scholarship should embrace the task of external critique through three different moves. The fi rst consists in emphasising the distributive stakes of each judgment (a). 73 The second is to take a position in support of the marginalised groups that may be saddled with the regressive distributive consequences of a judicial decision (b). A third move engages with deeper political and economic choices, and aims to achieve a more egalitarian, democratic and utopian society (c).
A. Foregrounding the Distributive Stakes
Through the lens of positive sociology functionalism, 74 scholars can highlight which groups or constituencies are impacted by the new allocation of rights and privileges that result from each judgment. This can be done through interdisciplinary, empirical or archival work. Jurists may have to borrow from other social sciences or engage directly in detective work in order to gain a broader sense of the consequences of judicial decisions, which extend beyond the perspective of the parties of any given case. 75 A lesson dear to the CLS movement, 76 but grounded in the earlier tradition of legal realism, 77 is that distributive effects are intrinsic to legal rules and that ' [l]aw is present whenever gains are distributed, facilitating their aggregation or ensuring their dispersion ' . 78 Take the liberalisation of education in the EU for instance -a timely topic in light of the potentially steep costs of Brexit. 79 Since the 1990s, England experienced a signifi cant infl ux of EU students entitled by EU law to UK national treatment with respect to both tuition fees and maintenance grants. It was in this context that the CJEU, with its decision in Bidar , 80 precipitated a political backlash. Denis Bidar, a French national, entered the UK to complete his secondary education and never had recourse to social assistance. In 2001, when he began to study economics at University College London, he received assistance for his tuition fees, but his application for fi nancial aid to cover his housing costs in London was refused on the ground that he was not suffi ciently settled in the UK. Seized with a preliminary question, in 2005 the CJEU held that, given Mr Bidar ' s ' genuine link ' with the UK, he could not be treated as a ' grant-tourist ' and as such discriminated against. He would therefore be able to receive the housing subsidy. The court was well aware of the consequences this decision would have for the UK education system. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of Bidar , the UK ramped up its residency requirements to three years for assistance seekers in similar situations. 81 Some scholars applauded Bidar as a progressive decision, enabling internal free movement and affi rming the principle of nondiscrimination, and praised the Court for putting a premium on ' residence, integration and solidarity: the longer the migrants are resident in the host State, the more integrated they are in the society of the host State in terms of benefi ts ' . 82 Others, however, condemned the regressive distributive consequences of this judgment in particular, and of the EU education saga in general. For instance, Gisella Gori noted that certain states, namely the UK and Belgium, were ' net importers of students ' in the context of European education mobility. According to Gori this was, in such states, a matter of public fi nance: broadening the class of housing assistance recipients would shift the funding of education from the private sector (via loans) to tax payers ' contributions (via grants). 83 The policy implications of Bidar appear equally regressive if examined through the lens of local government. Bidar ' s housing subsidy, allocated to students residing in the Ealing Borough, had a precise redistributive aim. Ealing is located in West London and is populated in large part by non-affl uent and immigrant people. 84 The resident subsidy for students in that particular borough was probably aimed at helping certain vulnerable groups such as the children of Polish, Caribbean and African immigrants rather than foreigners. But in the aftermath of Bidar , housing allowances to residents going to London universities became substantially lower with likely negative consequences for the intended benefi ciaries of the subsidy.
B. Taking a Stance
The second step in our external critique should enable scholars to explore the politics of judicial decision-making. Jurists know well that the doctrinal and social effects of each case are deeply intertwined. Even though law remains relatively autonomous, scholars can show how a particular interpretation of standing requirements, 85 free movement rights, or of a liability regime can have politically salient implications and favour certain groups at the expense of others. Take for instance Gonzalez Sanchez , 86 a hotly contested and arguably conservative decision of the ECJ: in this judgment the Court, through an activist interpretation of relevant rules, denied consumers who had contracted Hepatitis C through blood transfusions the possibility of suing their healthcare providers, and thus let them bear their own costs. Compare this case with Oc é ano Grupo , 87 a decision widely acclaimed by pro-consumer advocates. Here, two Spanish sellers sued fi ve buyers for unpaid sums, due under a contract of adhesion, for the sale of encyclopaedias. The ECJ famously allowed a Spanish court to declare the term void of its own motion, setting aside the sellers ' argument that this procedural matter should be determined by internal law only. It is important to note, in this regard, that while in cases like Gonzalez Sanchez or Oc é ano Grupo the progressive or regressive distributive consequences of the Court ' s holding are obvious, in others they remain rather indeterminate and that, given the nature of EU law, the Court ' s adjudication on legal questions may not have a clear distributive impact. 88 In such cases it is all the more imperative that scholars point out the distributive ambivalence of the Court ' s pronouncements. 89 
C. Pointing at Progress
A third move in our external critique refl ects the more utopian side of CLS, which requires pondering what to do post-critique in order to achieve a more equitable and democratic society. Here, scholars may promote ideological progress through legal doctrines, legal education, or judicial and lawyering techniques. 90 A more radical avenue is to show how legal reforms, no matter how well meaning, run out of steam if they are grafted onto larger systemic inequalities, 91 which can only be addressed through a reconceptualisation of basic legal entitlements, 92 transformative institutions, 93 or ideological changes. 94 This utopian vein characterises Hans-W Mickliz ' s refl ections on the outcome of Aziz . 95 This case, decided by a fi rst chamber led by Vice-President Tizzano in the role of reporting judge, is one of the most acclaimed decisions rendered in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis. The answer of the CJEU amounted to what scholars called an ' earthquake ' . 96 The Court held that the Spanish procedural rules impaired the level of protection required by the Unfair Terms Directive 97 and provided, in line with the opinion of AG Kokott, concrete guidance on how to apply the tests of ' signifi cant imbalance ' and ' good faith ' . 98 The outcome of Aziz led to several important reforms of Spanish mortgage enforcement procedures. 99 Most signifi cantly it showed desperate consumers, on the verge of losing their homes and deeply resentful of EU-led austerity policies, that the Court does not ignore humanity. 100 On the other hand, Micklitz has noted that defi ning standards of fairness is a much larger issue in an austerity-ridden Europe than the Aziz court was willing to concede. It is an issue that encompasses much more than the private law acquis , and calls for broader refl ections on the meaning of social rights in the EU Charter. 101 It is also problematic to let the Court be the sole social engineer in matters that require a much more robust and open democratic dialogue. While praising the court for ' getting it right ' in the particular context of Aziz , and for enabling pro-debtor litigation strategies across the EU, Micklitz reminded readers that the problem of mortgage insolvency could be much better handled via a mix of judicial, legislative and administrative solutions. 102 This is the sort of big-picture utopia that the CLS movement recommends, and that we hope to encounter more frequently in the academic commentary of CJEU decisions.
V. Scholarship and the Challenge of Indeterminacy
Foregrounding the distributive stakes of EU law disputes is clearly important when the judgment is cast in formalist terms, with unproblematic reference to the internal logic of the EU legal system. But identifying distributive issues is just as relevant when the court does engage in a balancing of confl icting rights or interests -a seemingly anti-formalist move -and yet portrays the stakes of the case as politically neutral, and eventually frames its result in the language of legal necessity. 103 This was the decision-making move adopted by the CJEU in such cases as Laval (C-341/05) and Viking (C-438/05), both obviously linked to radical tensions between organised Nordic labour, employers and lower-wage workers coming from newly acceded Member States. 104 In the aftermath of such judgments, a variety of commentators hurried to add texture to the court ' s analysis and to explain how, following the judgments, a particular vision of societal welfare had been asserted or reinforced. 105 Competing accounts emerged. Some saw these cases as a regrettable triumph of shallow cosmopolitanism, as an undue challenge to hard-fought labourcapital equilibria, and as a worrisome dismantlement of national inter-class solidarity. 106 Others looked at these disputes from the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe ' s job seekers and reached very different conclusions. This view emphasised that low-wage migrant workers were seeking not just free movement (an economic right), but also social rights (the right to work, the right to decent conditions), which were just as important as the social rights of the allegedly displaced Nordic workers. 107 Still others followed the on-the-ground repercussions of such cases, tracing the ensuing arrangements between social partners in the affected states and economic sectors. 108 The scholarly debate did not directly steer the court in one direction or another, but it made the crucial point that it was not possible for the Union to move forward without a thorough rethinking of labour-capital relations and without pondering, legally and politically, the distributive consequences of enhanced labour and capital mobility. The debate made clear, in other words, that the terse language of the EC Treaty on matters of free movement would not simply produce market effi ciencies (if any), but would more likely trigger competition for fi nite resources and require a new political and philosophical arrangement. It also made clear that social and economic rights, as spelled out in primary and secondary EU law, would be simply the beginning of politically diffi cult conversations -not closing lines of cogent legal syllogisms.
Similarly situated at the crossroads of confl icting value choices is a more recent decision, Alo and Osso . 109 The case revolved around the possibility for Syrian citizens, found worthy of subsidiary protection in Germany (though not yet eligible for refugee status), to pick and choose where exactly to settle in their host state. Here again, the Court found itself in the midst of confl icting considerations. On the one hand, the fact that both EU citizens and some categories of third-country nationals have the right to elect a place of residence, while subsidiary-protection recipients do not, is a form of discrimination, further complicating an already problematic distinction between ' mobile nationals and immobile aliens ' in EU law. 110 A fi rm judicial stance in favour of equal treatment should have led the court to allow these legal aliens to choose where to live. 111 On the other hand, Germany was seeking a margin of fl exibility in designing its immigration policy through a geographic restriction limited in time for those immigrants receiving public benefi ts. Foremost in the judges ' minds were likely the media ' s images of Molenbeek, the neighbourhood where several of the terrorists behind recent attacks in Paris and Brussels were living, or the deeply disturbing news of riots between xenophobic locals and third-country nationals in many different EU cities. Allowing Member States to direct some of their immigrants to particular parts of the territory might in some cases foster the goal of cultural, social and economic integration as well as redistribute the fi scal burden evenly among German L ä nder. 112 In the enormous body of literature comparing the available range of integration tools, Germany could certainly fi nd support for the idea that all urban areas should remain diverse and should host carefully balanced mixtures of people of different backgrounds, especially given the state ' s allocation of resources for such purposes. 113 The CJEU eventually decided to grant heavier weight to the latter considerations. The holding did narrow down the scope of Germany ' s policy choices, excluding that a Member State could mandate specifi c destinations for subsidiary protection benefi ciaries on the sole basis of budgetary concerns. At the same time, the Court held that the state should retain the power to choose the migrants ' place of residence if this proved necessary to the goals of integration and public safety -a result perhaps perceived as necessary at the time to quell anti-immigrant sentiment at the heart of Europe.
Cases like Viking , Laval , and Alo and Osso prove two points dear to CLS scholars. First, the distributive outcomes of adjudication are sometimes easy to identify as either progressive or regressive, but just as often they are really complicated, and may lead to disagreement even among scholars of equally progressive persuasion. The consequences of a judicial decision might remain under-determined, 114 or even prove wholly ambivalent, due to rapidly changing historical circumstances (and the European Union is certainly experiencing a time of turbulence). 115 Taking a stance may be diffi cult, and only partly possible. Utopian arguments put forth by legal academia may remain, indeed, utopian, and should be acknowledged as such. In some contexts, uncovering blind spots in the court ' s reasoning will be all that a scholar can do. As observed above, however, only an honest commentary informed by all relevant distributive possibilities can point in the direction of real progress.
Second, it is often the case that the law upon which judges must base their decision -be it black-letter law, a string of precedents, or relevant acquis -often ' runs out ' , and CLS ' s insight on the indeterminacy of legal rules should therefore be taken seriously. 116 At the end of the day, many judicial decisions are based on one or another vision of the common good, and involve choices between often irreconcilable world views. Even though judges cast their reasoning in terms of legal necessity, 117 no univocal conclusion can be reached in such disputes simply on the basis of legal rules and principles (free movement, non-discrimination, individual rights, international obligations, etc), which remain ultimately open-ended. This realisation can be painful, 118 not only for judges duly preoccupied with maintaining an aura of sheer objectivity, but also for progressive advocates, who would rather present their own argument as being clearly superior in point of law. 119 The realisation of law ' s indeterminacy, however, is often a necessary starting point for serious distributive analysis in scholarly circles. Progressive scholars are best positioned to voice the inner limits of legal argumentation, to aid the Court in identifying gaps, confl icts and ambiguities in the law, and hopefully to promote distributive justice and inclusion as paramount goals of the EU legal system. Only by acknowledging ' the inevitability of value-laden choice in adjudication ' 120 will legal scholars engage the Court in a continuous dialogue about values and perhaps, by so doing, move forward the ball of substantive justice.
